among several of the responses, I would like to use my response to explain the rationale for the thesis in more detail. Historians of the book have shown that practices of reading and writing have varied historically in accordance with the material forms available for the storage and retrieval of information. If we accept that "Transformations of the book and transformations of reading practices necessarily go hand in hand" (Cavallo and Chartier 1999, 15) , then why should this not also be the case for translation? After all, translating partakes in both reading and writing, and leaves us with a material record in the form of the translation itself. But here we must not confuse empirical evidence with material evidence. True, it is difficult to assess reading practices in the pre-modern period, or indeed in any period given the scarcity of empirical evidence left by real readers. Yet, the history of reading has shown that significant quantitative and qualitative shifts in reading practices have occurred with the shift from codex to print to hypermedia. Given that translation leaves real traces and marks on the page, I don't see how assessing transformations of translation practices in relation to transformations of the book (codex, print, digital) is any more of a "speculative exercise", to address Guyda Armstrong's concern, than assessing transformations of practices of reading. If anything, it makes the historian's life easier to have at hand the material record of the empirical base in the form of a writtendown translation.
But the disagreement is perhaps more fundamental than this. "Where we diverge" Armstrong writes, "is in our approach to and understanding of the relationship between historic media technologies and their supposed 'effects' on translation (simply put, the question of whether they shape or are shaped by their contemporary textual practices -or both)." My argument follows a key point made by print historian Donald McKenzie, namely that "forms effect meaning" (1999, 13) . He goes on to address "the complex relation of medium to meaning" in the context of the medieval codex and reiterates the point by stating that there appears to be an emergent consensus in medieval studies that "forms effect sense" (ibid., 18), a recognizably Further, by citing McLuhan approvingly, McKenzie (1999, 17) makes himself vulnerable to the charge of determinism by association. His insistence -on the one hand that material forms effect meaning or sense, which in effect gives objects agency, and on the other that we should not lose sight of "human agency" (15) because counter to the "anti-humanism" practiced by much of theory, bibliography can "correct that tendency" and "show the human presence in any recorded text" (29) -brings to the fore two radically incommensurable positions. One is object-oriented, the other is subject-or human-centred. This is a dividing line that characterizes many of the responses to my paper.
Song Hou and Xuanmin Luo, for instance, highlight the importance of Latour's theory that allows for the agency of objects, and Allison Burkette in drawing on archaeology makes it clear that objects are not necessarily passive things but "enactive partners in the creation of meaning". Working in the field of computeraided translation and machine translation, Minako O'Hagan is well aware of the impact of technology and non-human agents on translation and quite rightly presses for "theorization" to catch up with the "reality of modern translation". Rebecca
Kosick's response offers precisely such a theorization by framing these issues in relation to speculative realism, a philosophy that critiques the way in which humancentrist discourses regard even objects that precede humanity (Meillassoux's "arche- fossil" springs to mind here: 2008, 1-27) exclusively in terms of how these objects relate to us or what they tell us about ourselves, as Narcissus to a mirror. Evident here is an emphasis on the constitutive role that objects and machines play in translation.
Other respondents emphasize that objects, technologies, and media are "human-created" and the "results of human imagination and labor", that is, that they are "not haphazard or incidental but rather are conceived, planned, executed and signifying inside cultural matrices" (Coldiron); or, as Norbert Bachleitner does, that "media do not develop and work by themselves in a mystical way; they are invented, developed, adapted and eventually exchanged for other tools by human beings to serve certain purposes". Contrastively, when Susan Bassnett points out that I don't see technology as "dehumanizing" but regard it as a "mediation of basic laws of nature", she hits the nail on the head: technology, and indeed nature, are not passively there to serve as man's workshop or "inorganic body". There is no distinguishing the soil in which we grow stuff from the paper on which we draw. Rather, what is at issue is a non-reversible hierarchy: without nature to produce us, there can be neither technology, culture, nor politics, whereas without technology, culture and politics there still can be nature. My quibble then is with the over-inflation of the role and rule of humans in nature: yes, we make technologies, but a technology that acts counter to the laws of nature is impossible. As Durham Peters, making a case as to why "a philosophy of media needs a philosophy of nature" (2016, 1), puts it: "The agency of human beings is a question we should answer, but not a fact we should assume" (89). Technology is environmental. This is why I wrote that humanity cannot sequester itself from the ecology, as "natural" as it is technological, nor stand apart from, or without it, as if controlling it was simply a matter of pulling a plug. Thus, where
Williams pitches technology against human agency, culture against materialism and physiology, I have been gesturing towards another kind of argument altogether: since no human culture is possible without an enabling materiality and a possibilizing technology, culture and technology are not mutually exclusive, but on the contrary necessarily inclusive. And if this is so then technologies produce consequent imaginations: they are active in effecting the ways in which we think, read, write, and translate.
